Most-favored-nation treatment in investment treaties: Limits of application
https://doi.org/10.26907/2541-7738.2026.3.205-219
Abstract
This article examines most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment in investment treaties with special attention to the limits of its application in the contemporary arbitral practice. By tracing the evolution of different approaches to interpreting MFN clauses, the reasons behind the departure from expansive readings of MFN by investment tribunals were explained. Particular emphasis was placed on the distinction between substantive investment protection standards and procedural arrangements for dispute settlement, as well as on the operation of the ejusdem generis principle. Based on the analysis of recent international investment arbitration decisions and new treaty models, it was demonstrated that MFN treatment is no longer perceived as a universal tool for extending investor protection. The conclusion was therefore drawn that international investment law is adopting a more cautious and formalistic approach centered on treaty language, state consent, and legal certainty.
About the Author
I. I. Galimov
Kazan Federal University
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Ildus I. Galimov, Postgraduate Student, Department of International Law
Kazan
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For citations:
Galimov I.I. Most-favored-nation treatment in investment treaties: Limits of application. Kazan Journal of Historical, Linguistic, and Legal Research. 2026;168(3):205-219. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.26907/2541-7738.2026.3.205-219
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